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 The rising use of pharmacological enhancements in academic and work 
contexts1 makes discussion on the ethical use of such resources and their effects 
on the criteria of award-granting institutions increasingly important.  
Moral considerations for using biomedical enhancements are often 
approached from a utilitarian perspective––one that values maximizing 
collective productivity or happiness.2,3,4 Thus, this investigation would be 
enriched through the adoption of a Kantian lens, especially since the Kantian 
framework asks that we strive to improve and perfect our powers of body and 
mind. Conclusions from this work have the potential to inform future policies 
about the use of biomedical enhancements in cases of workplace negligence and 
in criteria of award-granting institutions.  
In this work, I argue that: adopting the Kantian framework permits the 
use of biomedical enhancements as a way to pursue self-perfection if it does not 
violate perfect duties, the use of such enhancements can be morally valuable and 
praiseworthy once we account for indirect duties, and enhancements’ effects on 
an agent’s expended effort should affect how institutions reward achievements 
that involved the use of enhancements. To achieve this, I interpret Kant’s 
primary texts and build upon the arguments of a variety of philosophers. 
 
1 Sarah Marsh, “Universities Must Do More to Tackle Use of Smart Drugs, Say Experts,” The 
Guardian, May 10, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/education/2017/may/10/universities-do-
more-tackle-smart-drugs-say-experts-uk-exams. 
2 Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, “The Duty to Be Morally Enhanced,” Topoi 38, no. 1 
(March 1, 2019): 7–14. 
3 Nicholas Agar, "Moral Bioenhancement and the Utilitarian Catastrophe," Cambridge Quarterly 
of Healthcare Ethics 24, no. 1 (January 2015): 37-47. 
4 Chris Gyngell and Simon Easteal, "Cognitive Diversity and Moral Enhancement," Cambridge 





 Through this project, I hope to achieve just a few things: report and 
defend the best interpretations of Kant’s duty to strive for self-perfection, apply 
these to the case of biomedical enhancements, and explore how such 
conclusions could be practiced in the criteria of award-granting institutions. The 
scope of my work is quite limited, however. 
 Importantly, I will not be defending the duty to self-perfect in itself, nor 
Kantian ethics, more generally. Since most policy decisions at institutional levels 
do not adhere to a single moral framework, I will simply convey what I think the 
application of Kantian ethics yields, and briefly assess whether such an 
application is intuitively appealing or already reflective of practices of award-
granting institutions and policies in certain workplaces.  
 
Terms and Distinctions 
 Since striving for self-perfection is the central topic of this work, it is 
essential to define what this perfection entails. Kant himself recognizes perfection 
as a concept that can be easily misunderstood. He draws a distinction between 
two kinds of perfection: quantitative and qualitative, and he identifies qualitative 
perfection as the proper end of the duty to self-perfect.5 He defines qualitative 
perfection as “the harmony of a thing’s properties with an end.”6 In the case of 
 
5 AK 6: 386. Throughout this work, I use the standard method of citing Kant’s work: referring to 
the Academy edition (AK) of his texts. The page number (386, here) follows the volume number 
(6, here) in this format.  
6 AK 6: 386.  
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the rational agent at the center of Kant’s ethical theory, the “properties” he has 
in mind include the agent’s humanity, “by which [she] alone is capable of setting 
[herself] ends.”7 The end Kant has in mind here is the possession of a will and 
capacities that allow the agent to fulfill the ends she sets herself. This involves 
“diminish[ing] ignorance by instruction,” “correct[ing] errors,” and cultivating a 
“moral feeling”––the “disposition” to be motivated to act by the moral law alone.8  
An end is, in Kant’s words “an object of free choice, the representation of 
which determines it to an action (by which the object is brought about) [original 
emphasis],”9 which can be likened to something (usually a goal) which motivates 
an agent to act.  
 I will understand an enhancement as the intentional use of an intervention 
that aims to improve a person’s existing capacity or create a new capacity.10 I will 
understand biomedical enhancements as those that directly affect the body’s 
cognitive or physical capacities, such as pharmaceutical substances or passive 
medical procedures. These are the types of enhancements I will be investigating 
in this work. The direct nature of biomedical enhancements can be understood 
in contrast to indirect means; direct enhancements do not, after administration, 
require effort on the part of the individual in order for there to be the intended 
effects, while indirect methods require active participation from the recipient of 
the enhancement in order for there to be effects.11 So, for example, when a person 
 
7 AK 6: 387.  
8 Ibid.  
9 AK 6: 384.  
10 Allen E. Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?: The Ethics of Biomedical Enhancement. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), 36. 
11 Farah Focquaert and Maartje Schermer further discuss the nature of direct and indirect means 
of enhancement, from the perspective of passive and active interventions in “Moral 
Enhancement: Do Mean Matter Morally?,” Neuroethics	8 (2015):	139–151. 
 7 
ingests a pill aimed at increasing focus, the pill itself acts on her brain directly, 
bringing about a more focused cognitive state. This pill would thus be considered 
a direct, biomedical enhancement. In contrast, indirect means to improve focus 
could involve therapy that requires the recipient’s attention and effort, which 
also affects brain function, but only through the recipient’s active participation 
in the therapeutic process.  
 An interesting distinction in the literature about biomedical 
enhancements is the difference between cognitive and physical enhancement; I 
posit a distinction based on the intended effects of each type of enhancement.  
Physical enhancements are those that affect the body’s ability to carry out 
physical actions (in contrast to cognitive actions, such as thinking). These may 
facilitate the building of muscle and improve strength, stamina, and control of 
one’s body, and do not directly influence any of the cognitive faculties mentioned 
earlier. Anabolic steroids, which increase muscle mass are an obvious example 
in facilitating the building of muscle mass. Beta-blockers, which can reduce 
tremors, can also be considered a physical enhancement as they enhance control 
of one’s body through decreasing tremors.  
Cognitive enhancements differ from physical enhancements in that they 
improve focus, alertness, memory, and motivation, and can reduce anxiety and 
stress. The relatively low risks of chemical cognitive enhancements, also called 
“smart drugs,” contribute to their popularity in academic contexts, and have seen 
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increased use in the United States and Europe over recent years.12,13 Some 
examples of these include: Ritalin and Adderall, which are prescribed to treat 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) by improving concentration, 
Modafinil, which is meant to treat sleeping disorders through increasing 
alertness and motivation, and, although they are also considered physical 
enhancements, beta-blockers can also be considered cognitive enhancers as 
anxiety-reducers, especially among musicians.14   
The risks of cognitive enhancements are usually low, or at least near 
those of commonly accepted methods of improving alertness, such as caffeine. 
These could include sleep disturbances and psychological addiction (as opposed 
to physical addiction). Furthermore, Ritalin has been prescribed to children with 
ADHD for over two decades—this indicates that it is considered safe enough for 
some of the most vulnerable members of the population, and no significant 
dangers have been reported thus far.15 Even so, the long-term effects of using 
such enhancements have not been studied extensively, which may pose a risk. 
Overall, however, it appears that the risks of using cognitive enhancements are 
relatively low.  
 
12 Arran Frood, “Use of ‘Smart Drugs’ on the Rise,” Scientific American, July 6, 2018, 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/use-of-ldquo-smart-drugs-rdquo-on-the-rise/. 
13 Simon Cotton, “Growing Use of Smart Drugs by Students Could Be a Recipe for Disaster,” The 
Conversation, http://theconversation.com/growing-use-of-smart-drugs-by-students-could-be-a-
recipe-for-disaster-77587. 
14 Vabren L. Watts, “Beta-Blockers Used by Musicians, Athletes, Students to Enhance 
Performance,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, August 16, 2010, 
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/health/20100816_Beta-
blockers_used_by_musicians__athletes__students_to_enhance_performance.html. 
15 Filippo Santoni de Sio, Nadira Faulmüller, and Nicole A Vincent, “How Cognitive 
Enhancement Can Change Our Duties,” Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience 8 (July 17, 2014), 1-4, 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnsys.2014.00131. 
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 On the other hand, the risks associated with physical enhancements vary, 
depending on the enhancement. The use of anabolic steroids and steroid 
precursors, for example, is associated with risk of blood-clotting problems, high 
blood pressure and cholesterol, irregular heartbeats, and liver problems, among 
others.16 Blood doping, which improves oxygen transport to muscle, aerobic 
capacity and endurance, increases the risks of blood clotting and stroke. Beta 
blockers which reduce tremors and anxiety can lower blood pressure, slow the 
heart rate, cause sleep disorders and induce spasm of the airways. Peptide 
hormones and growth factors––meant to stimulate the production of hormones 
in the body––are associated with a variety of negative effects: hypertension, 
blood cancers, anemia, strokes, heart attacks, pulmonary embolism, and thyroid 
problems, among others.17 Compared to the cognitive enhancements I described, 
physical performance-enhancing drugs seem to carry more health risks. These 
health risks may influence whether they would be permissible to use, on the 




16 Mayo Clinic Staff, “Performance-Enhancing Drugs and Teen Athletes,” Mayo Clinic, 
https://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/tween-and-teen-health/in-depth/performance-
enhancing-drugs/art-20046620. 





Understanding the Kantian Duty to Self-Perfect 
 
 
I.A. Introduction to Part I 
 In this section, I review interpretations of the Kantian duty to self-perfect, 
and show that the duty to strive for self-perfection is an imperfect duty to oneself. 
This understanding of the duty to self-perfect protects the Kantian from 
requiring the adoption of any and all means available to pursue self-perfection, 
leaving open a menu of choices for the agent. This understanding also permits 
the use of biomedical enhancements under certain conditions: that the 
biomedical enhancement does not pose any significant risks that would inhibit 
the user’s capacities to fulfill their moral duties.  
  
I.B Self-Perfection as an Imperfect Kantian Duty 
 
Kantian moral duties can be divided into two types: perfect and imperfect 
duties.18 A perfect duty requires only that the agent refrain from performing a 
moral transgression, or violation of the categorical imperative. A perfect duty is 
also narrow, meaning that it is specific to a maxim. To illustrate, if stealing 
another’s property violates the categorical imperative, then it is one’s perfect 
duty to refrain from stealing another’s property. Notably, a perfect duty is also a 
negative duty––it specifically requires that the agent to refrain from an action, 
rather than actively strive to achieve some end.  
 
18 AK 6: 240. 
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In contrast, an imperfect duty requires that the agent strive to achieve 
some end. Since an end can be achieved through a variety of different means, an 
imperfect duty “leaves a latitude for free choice,” so that it “cannot specify 
precisely in what way one is to act and how much one is to do by the action for 
an end that is also a duty.”19 Since an imperfect duty allows for a latitude of 
choice, it is considered a wide duty, which stands in contrast to a perfect, narrow 
duty. An imperfect duty is also a positive duty which does not specify how, 
exactly, to achieve that goal. By positive duty, I mean a duty to actively do 
something to achieve some end, unlike negative duties which tell us which 
actions we are to avoid.  
Kant argues that the duty to strive for self-perfection is an imperfect 
duty.20 This understanding of the duty to strive for self-perfection means that 
there is not a prescribed way to achieve self-perfection, and that the agent has a 
latitude of choice on how “to advance one’s own nature, personality, and moral 
perfection on the basis of critical self-reflection.”21 Kant importantly clarifies that 
the fulfillment of imperfect duties is also constrained by perfect duties; we 






19 AK 6: 390.  
20 AK 6: 240. 
21 Katharina Bauer, “Cognitive Self-Enhancement as a Duty to Oneself: A Kantian Perspective,” 
Southern Journal of Philosophy 56 (2018): 36-58, DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12267. 
22 AK 6: 390. 
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I.C. Self-Perfection as a Duty to Oneself 
Kant’s duty to self-perfect is also a duty to oneself, a kind of duty which 
has raised numerous objections.23 One such objection24 plays out in the following 
way:  
P1. A duty cannot be released by the person who owes a duty to someone.  
P2. A ‘duty to yourself’ would allow you to release the duty. 
C. You cannot have a ‘duty to yourself,’ because you can release it.  
At the surface, such an objection makes sense: P1 defines a necessary 
feature of a duty more generally and P2 takes advantage of the notion that having 
a duty towards someone confers on the duty ‘recipient’––the person to whom the 
duty is owed––the unique capacity to release the duty from the person who has 
the duty. In other words, on the objector’s view, if you are owed a ‘duty to 
yourself,’ you would be able to release it. The objector concludes that it is 
incoherent to owe and to be able to release a duty at the same time, by virtue of 
a duty requiring the person who owes to be unable to release the duty. When a 
single person is both the person who owes and is being owed the duty, this is 
impossible. In other words, being able to release a duty then disqualifies us from 
owing the duty––we cannot be allowed to release a duty we owe to someone, on 
the objector’s view.   
Although this objection describes well what duties are like intuitively, I 
argue that it does not successfully object to Kant, because P2 does not apply in 
the case of the Kantian duty to oneself: we cannot release ourselves from this 
 
23 Lara Denis, “Kant’s Ethics and Duties to Oneself,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78, no. 4 (1997): 
321–48, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00042. 
24 Marcus G. Singer, “On Duties to Oneself,” Ethics, 69 (1959): 202–5.  
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duty, because of our nature as moral agents. Kant claims that we have this duty 
to oneself out of respect for being the kind of moral agents who have humanity, 
in the Kantian sense of the term.25 Lara Denis summarizes this idea neatly: 
“[s]ince obligation works by our recognizing the worth of our own and others’ 
humanity as a constraint on our choice of action, we cannot release ourselves 
from duties to ourselves.”26 In other words, since we cannot escape or release this 
fact about ourselves––that we are moral agents who use reasons to set and 
pursue our goals, we cannot just release this obligation, which defeats P2.  
However, a new problem arises with such a response: if a duty confers a 
right to release that duty onto the person who is owed the duty, and we cannot 
release it, that would also conflict with the concept of a duty. So, we cannot have 
a duty to oneself on this understanding either, according to the objector. Even 
so, I think we can quell this concern by looking to features of the moral duties 
and the rights they confer toward agents other than yourself in the Kantian 
framework. The other moral duties in Kant's framework––those directed toward 
other moral agents––cannot be released by those agents either, by virtue of 
respecting their own humanity, too. They cannot simply opt-out of being moral 
agents worthy of being treated as ends in themselves. So, on the Kantian view, 
the fact that there are rights that cannot be released does not seem to be a 
problem, when considering who we are as moral agents. Even more generally, 
some argue that there are rights that cannot be given up.27  
 
25 Denis, “Kant’s Ethics and Duties to Oneself,” 335.  
26 Ibid.  
27 See Diana T. Meyers, Inalienable Rights: A Defense (Columbia University Press, 1986) for a deeper 
discussion on inalienable rights––rights that cannot be released under most, or even any, 
circumstance.  
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Why is it not possible to release these rights, on the Kantian view?  Kant 
claims we have duties to ourselves and to others that we cannot opt-out of by 
virtue of our rational nature, which is composed of our humanity and 
personality: “the capacity to set, organize, and pursue ends” and “the capacity to 
make the moral law a sufficient incentive for choice,” respectively.28 To illustrate 
why this is compelling, we can think about how Kant derives his moral law (in 
the form of the categorical imperative) in the first place: when pursuing any kind 
of goal, rational agents use reasons to decide how to pursue their ends. For 
example, when someone is thirsty, the reason they prepare a glass of water is to 
relieve their thirst. It would not be in accordance with their goal to eat salty foods 
(if they know this increases thirst). We are rational agents, because we use 
reasons to achieve our goals. It would thus be logically incoherent to 
intentionally perform some action that frustrates pursuit of a goal (knowing that 
the action is counterproductive), and then claim that the reason we chose to do 
such an action is to pursue our goal. In the same way, if a rational agent is to 
pursue a goal, it would be incoherent to try frustrating this pursuit by inhibiting 
her humanity, or her capacity to set goals and pursue them. Thus, the duty to 
oneself and to others cannot simply be released––but these are both coherent on 
Kant’s view. Thus, the objector’s understanding of a duty as requiring the duty 
‘recipient’ to have the right to release the duty does not apply to the Kantian 
account, so it does not object adequately to a duty to oneself. 
Now moving on from this objection, another objector could posit that 
moral duties have to relate to others because we already care about ourselves 
 
28 Denis, “Kant’s Ethics and Duties to Oneself,” 325. 
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naturally. In other words, moral duties are supposed to make us care about 
others. Along a similar line of thought, some also object by claiming that duties 
to oneself are just claims of self-interest. To respond to these objections, I would 
like to point out that a moral obligation involving our striving for self-perfection 
actually does have impact on those around us. This is clear when we consider 
how pursuing the development of capacities that make it easier for ourselves to 
fulfill our moral duties later on impacts how we interact with others: whether we 
have the relevant skills to assist others and the proper strength of will in order to 
do the right thing surely influences the wellbeing of those around us.  
In this section, I identified the most important features of the Kantian 
duty to strive for self-perfection. It is a duty to oneself, which does not define the 
specific way we are to pursue self-perfection and is constrained by our perfect 
duties. I will be operating with this understanding of the Kantian imperfect duty 
to self-perfect for the rest of this work.  
 
I.D Permissibility of Biomedical Enhancements 
Biomedical enhancements––mood enhancers, cognitive enhancers, and 
physical enhancers all aim to improve on an agent’s existing capacities or create 
new ones. They are thus a way to strive for self-perfection––one option among 
the latitude available to the Kantian. The only way the use of biomedical 
enhancements would be impermissible is if the agent’s maxim involving their 
use violates the categorical imperative. One way that enhancements would 
violate a perfect duty would involve decreasing the agent’s capacity to set goals 
and pursue them. Trying to frustrate the pursuit of one’s goals by inhibiting her 
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capacity to set goals and pursue them contradicts an agent’s pursuit of such an 
action in the first place. 
Thus, taking biomedical enhancements that pose a risk to one’s health in 
such a way that would actively inhibit their capacities would be prohibited. If an 
enhancement poses minimal risks to the user in terms of inhibiting the agent’s 
capacity to pursue their goals, and their use does not violate the categorical 
imperative, then they are permissible29. In this way, the enhancements that have 
lower risks of adverse effects are more aligned with the Kantian duty to strive for 
self-perfection, than enhancements that have many high-risk effects on the 
agent’s well-being.  
 
Some Concerns 
A concern that arises in response to the imperfect duty to self-perfect is 
that encouraging people to take biomedical enhancements might treat people as 
a mere means to the end of better performance in work.30 Such a concern can be 
resolved by protecting against such an outcome; we can ensure that we are 
receiving a person’s consent to give them such enhancements and that this 
person is not coerced or pressured into making this choice for themselves.  
Furthermore, given that only the agent herself can set her own ends,31 
Kantian ethics does not lead to a duty to enhance others (and subsequent 
 
29 Another important feature to achieve permissibility has to do with egalitarian concerns, to 
ensure that there are not unfair advantages created with unequal access to enhancements. In 
order to ensure maxims are universalizable, biomedical enhancements would also have to be 
accessible to all people using them in a given context, or community. For a discussion on the 
importance of accessibility for permissibility on the Kantian view, see Clewis, “Does Kantian 
Ethics condone Mood and Cognitive Enhancement?,” Neuroethics 10 (2017): 349-361. 
30 Bauer, “Cognitive Self-Enhancement as a Duty to Oneself: A Kantian Perspective,” 44.  
31 AK 6: 386.  
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paternalism), unlike consequentialist views.32 While consequentialist views 
might stress that we owe it to others and to society to self-enhance (that it is a 
duty to others), the Kantian duty to self-perfect is a duty to oneself. Kant makes 
this idea very clear when he claims: 
“[I]t is a contradiction for me to make another’s perfection my end 
and consider myself under obligation to promote this. For the 
perfection of another man, as a person, consists just in this: that he 
himself is able to set his end in accordance with his own concepts 
of duty; and it is self-contradictory to require that I do (make it my 
duty to do) something that only the other himself can do. [original 
emphasis]”33 
 In other words, we cannot force another person’s self-perfection, 
because only that person can set her own ends to fulfill this moral duty to herself. 
While we may suggest goals for the person, only that person can adopt her own 
goals.34  
Another concern that arises with the permissibility of biomedical 
enhancements and the duty to strive for self-perfection is that it may indirectly 
support social norms of high performance and high output, without attending to 
social determinants of certain environments (e.g. underfinanced institutions, 
bad working conditions, lack of accommodations, etc.). In other words, such a 
duty seems to place the burden of improvement on the individual, rather than 
 
32 Bauer, “Cognitive Self-Enhancement as a Duty to Oneself: A Kantian Perspective,” 28.  
33 AK 6: 386. 
34 Martin Gunderson agrees with my view in “Seeking Perfection: A Kantian Look at Human 
Genetic Engineering,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28, no. 2 (April 1, 2007): 87–102, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-007-9030-4. 
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institutions that can implement changes to the work environment. Looking only 
at the Kantian view on duty to self-perfect, it is not clear how to ensure that 
people are not pressured into setting ends that align with potentially toxic 
societal expectations and values.  
In response to this concern, I argue that although Kantian ethics may not 
be able to solve this problem altogether,35 the Kantian duty to self-perfect might 
be less demanding than its utilitarian counterpart. Utilitarianism would likely 
require high performance and high output to maximize productivity and 
accommodate societal standards, at the individual’s expense. Kantian ethics may 
not have an inherent bias-correcting mechanism, but it allows the agent a kind 
of flexibility that utilitarianism cannot, by virtue of the fact that the duty to self-
perfect is an imperfect duty to oneself, meaning that our pursuit of self-
perfection is not aimed at pleasing others, but rather an expression of respect for 
one’s own capacity to set goals for oneself and pursue them. Furthermore, Kant 
draws attention to the importance of introspection and self-reflection in the 
process of fulfilling this indirect duty to self-perfect. He claims that the areas of 
perfection a person chooses to pursue are “left for [her] to choose in accordance 
with [her] own rational reflection about what sort of life [she] would like to lead 
and whether [she] has the powers necessary for it.”36 Kant thus takes on a 
surprisingly empathetic and flexible approach to the development and 
cultivation of one’s capacities.  
 
35 Perhaps referring to Kant’s duty to further the happiness of others would be a valuable avenue 
for resolving this concern, since it seems that pressuring people with disabilities to take on the 
burdens of conforming to societal expectations does not further their happiness. See AK 6: 388 
for an introduction on this duty.  
36 AK 6: 445.  
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Thus, the use of biomedical enhancements is permitted on the Kantian 
view, if their use carries minimal risks and does not violate any perfect duties. 
The concerns that arise with this duty to strive for self-perfection, including the 
potential to treat people as mere means and to unjustly burden the individual 
with improvement in workplaces, can be resolved.  
 
I.E. Potential for Requiring Enhancements as Part of a Profession 
 Although Kantian ethics does not require us to self-perfect in a specific 
way, I argue that it could be used to assess the potential for new duties to use 
biomedical enhancements in high-stakes professions, such as medicine and 
transportation. Namely, I think the adoption of Kantian values would prevent 
the requirement of such a duty in professional contexts. To make my argument, 
I will respond to the reasons brought forward by Filippo Santoni de Sio, Nadira 
Faulmuller and Nicole Vincent, who think there is good reason to suspect that 
professionals may be required to take cognitive enhancers for their work in the 
future, since the use of such enhancements would improve the safety and 
outcomes of those served by these professions.  
	
	Assessing Precedent 
Santoni de Sio et al. argue that we can expect certain professions––those 
with high stakes and little room for error such as airplane pilots and surgeons––
will eventually require the use of cognitive enhancements that could improve 
focus and energy. They begin by pointing out that there are already precedents 
for such requirements: scientific and technological advancements have already 
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brought with them the creations of new duties in the medical context, such as 
the use of antiseptics and carbolic acid for cleansing prior to surgeries and 
continued education programs. Burdening professionals with such practices at 
the expense of these individual freedoms expresses the idea that the well-being 
and safety of the public is more important than respecting professionals’ 
individual freedoms in the workplace.  
In response to this example, they rightfully point out that the extent of 
invasiveness is different between enhancers and cleansers, so this argument by 
analogy is not effective. The use of enhancements entails consuming a pill of 
some kind that alters one’s cognitive function for an extended amount of time, 
while the use of cleaning products does not involve ingestion or the alteration of 
a person’s cognitive capacities. Thus, such an analogy is not productive.  
The invasiveness of requiring the ingestion of enhancements may be 
better represented by recognizing the precedent that certain people are already 
legally required to take medical substances to perform certain activities: people 
with epilepsy or diabetes cannot operate motor vehicles without medical 
substances that help prevent adverse events, like seizures and hypoglycemic 
crises, respectively. Such mandates are usually justified because this practice 
protects others who may be harmed by the adverse events as a result of not taking 
drugs. Similarly, the use of ingestible enhancements would likely improve the 
outcomes of surgeons and pilots, at the expense of these professionals’ individual 
freedoms. Furthermore, in the specific case of surgeons and pilots, there is 
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already a precedent about fatigue management with caffeine.37 Santoni de Sio et 
al. thus conclude that, based on precedent, we should expect certain professions 
to require the use of cognitive enhancements in the future.  
In addressing safety concerns associated with the use of cognitive 
enhancements, the authors point out that the cognitive enhancement 
methylphenidate has already been prescribed to children for hyperactivity and 
attention deficit disorders for over two decades, without identifying any negative 
long-terms effects. The fact that they are being prescribed to such a vulnerable 
population indicates that they are deemed safe enough for use.  
Some counterindications could include the fact that the efficacy of 
pharmacological enhancers has not been established yet, and that laypeople are 
suspicious of enhancers in general.38 However, I would say that these 
counterindications seem capable of being resolved with more public exposure 
and time, and they would likely already be resolved by the time questions about 
requiring the use of enhancements arise in policy decisions.  
 
Kantian Considerations Would Not Require Enhancements 
 Although courts may argue the way Santoni de Sio et al. describe, it is 
clear that the adoption of a Kantian perspective would prevent professionals 
from being required to take such enhancements, if we treat this as a case of 
forcing another person to self-perfect. Kant immediately disqualifies such 
behavior as a moral duty, since it does not respect the agent’s capacity to set goals 
 
37 Santoni de Sio, Faulmüller and Vincent, “How Cognitive Enhancement Can Change Our 
Duties,” 2.  
38 Ibid, 3.  
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for herself.39 However, a related question can be posed here: should the surgeon 
herself feel compelled to self-perfect through the use of biomedical 
enhancements?   
I argue that surgeons should not feel required to take biomedical 
enhancements as a means to self-perfect. This is the case for the same reasons 
that Kantians are not required to use biomedical enhancements specifically in 
pursuing the end of self-perfection: when adopting an end, there are many ways 
to reach that end. Unless a practice violates a perfect duty or actively works 
against achieving the end of self-perfection, people have the choice in selecting 
the specific ways they choose to pursue it. Although this may seem trivial on the 
surface, it is important to point out that another person’s health and life is very 
closely connected to the surgeon’s skills and striving for self-perfection, unlike in 
cases where someone might want to, say, learn a language, which is not as clearly 
connected to another’s life and wellbeing. A person’s life depends on the 
surgeon’s expertise––is it really permissible to not maximize one’s skills 
wherever possible, with such high stakes?     
 We can begin by identifying the surgeon’s ends. In the surgeon’s case, her 
ends include improving the safety of her patients and the rate of success of her 
operations, at a minimum. Indeed, the use of cognitive enhancements aimed at 
improving the surgeon’s focus and energy during an operation aligns with these 
ends. It is also the case that if a surgeon were to get enough sleep, practice 
simulated surgeries often enough to build up stamina, or successfully convince 
their place of work to set limits on the number of work hours per week, there 
 
39 AK 4: 388.  
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may be similar effects on focus and energy.40 Thus, there is a variety of methods 
that can achieve the surgeon’s ends; the surgeon need not take cognitive 
enhancements in order to pursue this end.  
 Would refusing to take cognitive enhancements work against achieving 
the surgeon’s ends of improving patient safety and rate of operation success? I 
argue that this is not the case. Although the outcome of not taking cognitive 
enhancements may be worse compared to the outcome associated with taking 
enhancements in terms of pursuing the surgeon’s ends, in itself, refusing to take 
enhancements does not decrease patient safety or the success of the operation 
compared to the surgeon’s state prior to the choice of refusing enhancements. 
This distinction can be illustrated by a surgeon who intentionally chooses not to 
rest from work in a way that decreases her energy going into an operation; this 
choice makes the surgeon worse off compared to the surgeon’s prior state. In short, 
in the case of using enhancements, the later state is the same as the prior state of 
the surgeon who refused enhancements; in the case of refusing to rest, the later 
state is worse than the prior state.  
One may object by pointing out that such reasoning may fail when 
considering the use of sterilizing equipment and hand washing prior to surgery. 
Perhaps the surgeon could just wear personal protective equipment and skip out 
on sterilizing equipment and hand washing; compared to the “prior state” of not 
having on any equipment at all, this is surely a better way to try improving the 
 
40 A study about the effects of modafinil on sleep-deprived surgeons when completing a 
simulated surgery reports that there are no clear improvements with the use of modafinil, 
surprisingly. See Colin Sugden et al., “Effect of Pharmacological Enhancement on the Cognitive 
and Clinical Psychomotor Performance of Sleep-Deprived Doctors: A Randomized Controlled 
Trial,” Annals of Surgery 255, no. 2 (February 2012): 222–27, 
https://doi.org/10.1097/SLA.0b013e3182306c99.  
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state of the patient’s safety. This objection speaks to concerns about the features 
relevant to the “prior state” in question, which I will now address. 
In response, I propose that the relevant features of the “prior state” can 
be described by identifying the reasons for certain actions aimed at changing the 
“state” in question. In the case of this objection, the reasons for using personal 
protective equipment, sterilizing equipment, and hand washing is to minimize 
the patient’s infection risk, which is tied to patient safety. Thus, when talking 
about “prior state” in this example, we are talking specifically about the “prior 
state” of the patient’s infection risk. While a surgeon’s focus and energy upon 
starting an operation do not clearly change, a patient’s infection risk clearly 
increases from her prior (pre-surgical) state to her state during the surgery. 
Furthermore, a surgeon’s focus and energy are not clearly tied to infection risk. 
All of the aforementioned methods––using personal protective equipment, 
sterilizing equipment, hand washing prior, and others––make up for this 
worsened circumstance in terms of infection risk. When the surgeon has the goal 
of patient safety, and the patient undergoes a procedure in which they are at 
increased risk to frustrate this goal, it makes sense to make up for the risk, so that 
there is a net likelihood of achieving the goal. Otherwise, if there is a net risk of 
frustrating the goal through a given action, it would be contradictory to adopt 
such an action.  
Recognizing the subject of the prior state is crucial. The patient’s 
infection risk changes for the worse compared to the prior state of infection risk 
just by undergoing the surgery, and action must be taken to make up for this if 
the surgeon is to coherently pursue her end of patient safety. On the other hand, 
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in the case of refusing cognitive enhancements, the “prior state” is that of the 
surgeon’s focus and energy––which is also tied to patient safety––but it is not 
clear that a surgeon’s focus and energy changes for the worse by starting an 
operation. Surgeons are already very good at what they do, which requires 
having developed an appropriate level of focus and energy to perform 
operations; otherwise, they would not be licensed to perform them. The same 
goes for airplane pilots and bus drivers.  
In short, refusing cognitive enhancements does not result in a worsened 
state, compared to the prior state of a surgeon’s focus and energy. An objection 
to this principle, involving decreased use of procedures that minimize infection 
risk does not work, because the state of the infection risk already increases due 
to surgery, so actions must be adopted to make up for this worsened state, in 
order to coherently pursue the end of patient safety. Surgeons, airplane pilots, 
and bus drivers all have alternative methods of improving focus and energy in 
their professions: insisting their places of work limit the number of working 
hours each week and practicing their skills to improve stamina are other 
methods available to them. Thus, according to Kantian considerations, it is not 
necessary that professionals feel obligated to use cognitive enhancements on 
their own. If these enhancements pose minimal risks, workplaces may make 
them accessible and encourage their use, but requiring them should not be 
necessary, if institutions were to adopt Kantian considerations. Most 
importantly, there are already licensing criteria in place to ensure that surgeons 
and pilots perform at a level high enough, so that any improvements in patient 
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safety would be almost negligible, compared to the training and resources in 






Effort and Praiseworthiness 
 
II.A Introduction to Part II 
 In the previous section, I described how the Kantian duty to self-perfect 
is an imperfect duty, meaning that it is a positive duty that leaves the specific 
goals of self-perfection up to the agent to reflect on and adopt, as long as the 
maxim upon which she is acting are morally permissible––meaning that it does 
not violate the categorical imperative.  
 In this section, I hope to show how the Kantian duty to self-perfect may 
lead to the capacity for evaluating the moral worth of actions that we may not 
traditionally consider to be morally relevant. To illustrate, if a person adopts 
learning a foreign language in order to fulfill the duty to self-perfect and are 
sufficiently motivated by this motive of duty, then their foreign-language 
acquisition can merit moral praise. Next, I will develop the ideas of Robert 
Clewis, who argues that the use of biomedical enhancements is valuable, 
because it allows us to overcome counterproductive dispositions.41 I aim to 
demonstrate how his argument somewhat misses the point that Kant makes 
about the value of overcoming counterproductive dispositions: overcoming 
these dispositions is valuable, because it trains the person––helps prepare them–
–to fulfill their moral duties later on, making the overcoming of dispositions 
something like an indirect moral duty. It is a way of training one’s cognitive 
capacities to better perform self-rule––to make morally permissible decisions 
 
41 Robert Clewis, “Does Kantian Ethics Condone Mood and Cognitive Enhancement?,” 
Neuroethics 10 (2017): 357, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-017-9302-2. 
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based on moral duty and reason. I will substantiate this argument by referring to 
the case studies Kant presents the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, 
regarding actions that have moral worth.  
I will then discuss how biomedical enhancements affect the praise we 
assign to projects completed with their use. I will outline how Hasko von 
Kriegstein’s argues that the level of effort used by a person should correlate to 
the level of achievement and praise granted to the agent. When biomedical 
enhancements increase the energy, time, and other effort-associated resources 
available to an individual, they reduce the ‘percentage-effort’ a person expends 
in pursuing a goal. Since biomedical enhancements increase the mental 
resources available to an agent, thus decreasing the percentage-effort a person 
expends, an agent’s action merits less praise as an achievement with the use of 
biomedical enhancements. I will conclude Part II with a discussion of the 
practical applications of the conclusions I reached thus far in my project. 
Namely, I will discuss how award-granting institutions may be affected by the 
use of biomedical enhancements, if they were to adopt the Kantian view.  
 
II.B Establishing Skill-Building Projects as Morally Valuable 
 In focusing only on the categorical imperative and the perfect duties it 
prescribes, Kantian ethics takes on a fairly conservative character; it seems only 
to define negative duties––maxims we should not act on towards others––rather 
than positive duties––or maxims we should actively pursue, as opposed to what 
we are simply permitted to do. However, once we take into account Kant’s claims 
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about imperfect duties to oneself and indirect moral duties, this ethical 
framework seems to demand more of the agent.  
In this section, I argue that skill-building projects motivated by the duty 
to self-perfect can be considered morally valuable, meaning they have moral 
worth. This is a vital step in this project, because once we recognize skill-building 
projects as morally valuable in the Kantian framework, we can assign them 
moral praise. Once this is established, we can apply moral reasoning to the 
assignment of praise for certain projects that do not necessarily involve moral 
obligations towards other people. This allows for the moral assessment of 
projects such as creative endeavors, learning, sports, and the like, which are 
traditionally considered only morally-permissible, not morally-valuable. My 
argument can be structured in the following way:  
P1. Moral praise can be assigned to an action if and only if that 
action has moral worth.42 
P2. Moral worth can be assigned to an action if and only if the 
action was done, because the agent was sufficiently motivated by 
their moral duty.43 
C1. Moral praise can be assigned to an action if and only if the 
agent was sufficiently motivated by their moral duty.  
P3. The striving for self-perfection is a moral duty.44  
P4. Skill-building is an instance of striving for self-perfection. 
 
42 AK 4: 398. 
43 AK 4: 398. 
44 AK 6: 445-447. 
 30 
C2. If skill-building is motivated by moral duty, then it merits 
moral praise. 
 This argument is fairly straightforward. Premises 1-3 were derived from 
Kant’s primary texts. Premises 1 and 2 make sense, given Kant’s assessment of 
moral worth in the Groundwork: an action “has no true moral worth” unless it is 
done “not from inclination but from duty,” and it makes sense to praise actions 
that carry this special “esteem” conferred by moral worth on Kant’s view.45  
 Regarding premise 3, Kant clarifies that “[i]t is man’s duty to strive for 
this perfection, but not to reach it… and his compliance with this duty can, 
accordingly, consist only in continual progress.”46 In other words, Kant does not 
expect a person to reach perfection, but a person can set striving for perfection as 
her end. In this way, Kant evades the objection that a person cannot be expected 
to do something they cannot actually accomplish, in other words, the idea that 
“ought-implies-can” is satisfied here. One ought to strive for perfection, because 
they can strive for perfection––not achieve it.  
Premise 4 is an illustration of premise 3; skill-building is a general term 
that can be applied to any one of the three categories of capacities Kant describes: 
powers of spirit, mind, and body. Powers of spirit are “of the sort to be found in 
mathematics, logic, and the metaphysics of nature,” and “whose exercise is 
possible only through reason.”47 Powers of mind are those which “include 
memory, imagination, and the like, on which can be built learning… which 
 
45 AK 4: 398. 
46 AK 6: 447. 
47 AK 6: 445. 
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furnish instruments for a variety of purposes.”48 Finally, powers of the body are 
those which are “looking after the basic stuff (the matter) in man, without which 
he could not realize his ends [original emphasis].”49 Indeed, a person can train 
and perfect skills within any of these categories, to better equip herself to set any 
kinds of ends for herself and pursue them. Since Kant categorizes the striving for 
perfection as an imperfect moral duty to the agent herself,50 when a person is 
sufficiently motivated by duty, then the action merits moral praise.  
 
II.C Value in Overcoming Counterproductive Dispositions 
 Now that we have established how skill-building can be morally valuable, 
we can investigate how biomedical enhancements influence the praise we assign 
actions, if they are motivated by moral duty. In this section, I will respond to the 
ideas of Robert Clewis, who argues that the use of biomedical enhancements is 
valuable because it helps us overcome our negative dispositions and concludes 
that the use of enhancements is permissible on the Kantian account.51 However, 
I would like to develop his discussion on the value of enhancements, rather than 
simply their permissibility, which can be determined by the categorical 
imperative alone. Of note, although Clewis uses the term neuroenhancements in 
his work, this term and the one I use in this project, biomedical enhancements, are 
interchangeable, since both enhancements function to improve a person’s 
capacities directly.  
 
48 AK 6: 445 
49 AK 6: 445 
50 AK 6: 446-447 
51 Clewis, “Does Kantian Ethics Condone Mood and Cognitive Enhancement?,” 360.  
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The argument Clewis presents can be outlined in the following way.52  
P1. It is valuable (on the Kantian account) to overcome our 
dispositions that stand in the way of achieving our goals. 
P2. Certain neuroenhancements help us overcome our 
dispositions that stand in the way of achieving our goals. 
C. Using certain neuroenhancements is valuable. 
 This argument is quite straightforward; Premise 1 is supported by Kant’s 
account of what kinds of actions are valuable (or worthy of praise): those that are 
motivated by moral duty, especially if they require overcoming negative 
dispositions to do the right thing.53,54 Since I will not be investigating the 
persuasiveness of Kantian ethics fundamentally, we can grant this. Premise 2 
does not require a deep investigation either; we can consider mood 
enhancements that make it easier for people to be kind towards others to help 
them or cognitive enhancements that improve focus to help complete work. Both 
examples illustrate how certain enhancements can overcome dispositions––
rudeness or tendency to distraction, respectively–– that stand in the way of 
projects such as helping others and getting work done, respectively.  
 One objection to this argument is that self-rule is the valuable feature of 
overcoming counterproductive dispositions; Kant asks us to control our 
emotions and dispositions, rather than “attempt to get rid of” them.55 Self-rule 
can be understood as “governing one’s passions, [original emphasis]” according 
 
52 Clewis, “Does Kantian Ethics Condone Mood and Cognitive Enhancement?,” 357. 
53 AK 4: 398. 
54 AK 6: 228.  
55 Clewis, “Does Kantian Ethics Condone Mood and Cognitive Enhancement?,” 359.  
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to Kant,56 who goes on to say that we have a moral obligation “to bring all [our] 
capacities and inclinations under [our] (reason's) control and so to rule over 
[ourselves], which goes beyond forbidding [us] to let [ourselves] be governed by 
[our] feelings and inclinations (the duty of apathy); for unless reason holds the 
reins of government in its own hands, [our] feelings and inclinations play the 
master over [us]. [original emphasis]”57 In other words, self-rule is the ability to 
be motivated by reasons alone to act a certain way, and it involves using reason 
to overcome our emotions and dispositions; responding to reason is the force 
behind an action in the case of self-rule. The objector points out that in 
introducing some enhancement to more easily perform a certain action, reason 
plays a smaller role in the agent’s motivation to act, which reduces the self-rule 
required to perform an action. In this way, self-rule is not enhanced. 
A response to such an objection can proceed like this: enhancements 
actually provide “more self-rule, to enable better or more efficient handling of 
negative moods and cognitive obstacles,” as put forward by Robert Clewis.58 In 
this way, enhancements do not stand in the way of our self-rule, but actually 
promote this valuable capacity. We may know the reasons and feel compelled by 
the reasons for which we should pursue a course of action, but we cannot get 
ourselves to perform the action dictated by reason alone, so we employ an 
enhancement to help fulfill our goal.  
This response puts forward an interesting perspective on what it means 
to have reason “govern” our passions: it seems to claim that when recognizing 
 
56 AK 4: 407.  
57 AK 4: 408.  
58 Clewis, “Does Kantian Ethics Condone Mood and Cognitive Enhancement?,” 359.  
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that reasons alone may not have enough motivational force, it is an instance of 
self-rule to use other methods to fulfill what is dictated by reason. It moves the 
question of what self-rule involves back a step, but is it still considered an 
instance self-rule if the force of reason alone is not enough to perform an action? 
To better illustrate this distinction, we can imagine an individual who observes 
someone drowning in a lake. This individual reasons that she has the skills to 
save the drowning person and wants to help, but she finds herself frozen in fear. 
She turns to another person nearby and asks to give her a push into the water, 
because she knows she will not be able to overcome this fear on her own. The 
individual is pushed into the lake and successfully saves the drowning person, as 
she was motivated by reason to do. This is the type of self-rule Clewis speaks to; 
the objector would deny that the individual exercised self-rule successfully, 
because they could not overcome their fear by reason alone.  
Unfortunately for Clewis, Kant seems to take on the more conservative 
lens of this objector. He encourages us to develop our self-rule in a way where 
“reason holds the reins of government in its own hands,”59 which seems to 
indicate a direct influence of reason on the adoption of a course of action, and 
truly overcoming passions through reason alone, not just reducing them. By 
introducing enhancements as an intervention, we are not strengthening reason’s 
force, but reducing passions that stand in reason’s way.  
 Given Kant’s conservative view of self-rule, it thus seems misplaced to 
claim that biomedical enhancements promote self-rule, when they do not 
 
59 AK 6: 408. 
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influence the force of reason directly. Instead, they target the passions.60 So then, 
how can enhancements be valuable? I argue that we can save the value of 
enhancements, by recognizing that it is valuable to reduce negative passions that 
inhibit the fulfillment of our moral duties in Kant’s view, because there is an 
indirect moral duty to develop one’s passions in a way that make it easier to fulfill 
direct moral duties. Since biomedical enhancements can improve our passions, 
if motivated correctly, their use would be valuable because they fulfill an indirect 
duty.  
 I think Kant would be sympathetic to this idea; he even claims that it is an 
“indirect duty to cultivate the compassionate natural (aesthetic [ästhetische]) 
feelings in us, and to make use of them. [original italics]”61 We can also look to 
the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals for an account of indirect duties: Kant 
describes a case in which “a sufferer from gout” is no longer inclined to preserve 
his happiness due to his “groundless expectations” of having perfect health, but 
continues to attempt to achieve happiness by “choos[ing] to enjoy what tastes 
good and to suffer what he must.”62 Kant claims that this sufferer from gout is 
fulfilling his moral duty by remaining in an acceptable state of happiness, 
because this would deter him from transgressing moral duty in searching for 
morally-impermissible means of achieving happiness. This preservation of “an 
acceptable state of happiness” can be understood as an indirect moral duty, since 
the person would be preserving and improving his ability to intentionally choose 
 
60 I would like to thank Professor Janum Sethi for her especially valuable insight here––helping 
me bridge my account of indirect duties with the duty to strive for self-perfection.  
61 AK 6: 457. 
62 AK 4: 399.  
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to make the morally permissible decision, even if it is through nurturing 
dispositions, rather than self-rule. Kant supports and praises the nurturing of 
such positive dispositions, when he states that a behavior which “serves the 
common good and is in conformity with duty… is thus worthy of honor” and 
“deserves praise and encouragement.”63  
 This indirect duty to facilitate the fulfilment of direct duties through the 
cultivation of favorable passions is clearly associated with the imperfect duty to 
strive for self-perfection. In fulfilling such an indirect duty, an agent also fulfills 
the duty to strive for self-perfection, since she is developing her powers of mind–
–those capacities that are neither related to reason itself nor the body’s physical 
ability.64  
 The inclusion of such indirect moral duties in Kant’s theory also resolves 
an objection that is frequently raised when assessing praiseworthiness of an 
action on Kant’s view: if a right action merits more praise when it is more 
challenging to do the right thing, then we should try to hate others, so that it is 
harder to do the right thing, granting our actions more praiseworthiness, in this 
way. Once we account for the idea of an indirect duty on Kant’s view, this 
objection is resolved, since it seems right to hold the agent blameworthy for 
making it easier for herself to do things that are morally impermissible––
violating her indirect duty.   
 
63 AK 4: 398. 
64 See AK 6: 445 for a detailed description of the powers of mind, spirit, and body Kant has in 
mind. He describes the powers of mind as those which include “imagination” and which “furnish 
instruments for a variety of purposes;” which seem most closely connected to cultivating passions 
that align with reason’s ends.  
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This idea of an indirect duty raises another important point about 
Clewis’s account: it seems like the understanding of enhancements Clewis 
employs does not account for the nuance that arises when we recognize that 
some enhancements can help an agent realize her immediate goals, but do not 
require improving any passions or capacities for future situations, which is a 
requirement of the duty to strive for self-perfection.  
Without the intention of fulfilling an indirect duty or the duty to self-
perfect, the use of biomedical enhancements is only ‘valuable’ in the practical 
sense of reaching one’s goals––meaning it is valuable in fulfilling hypothetical 
imperatives only. Hypothetical imperatives, according to Kant, “represent the 
practical necessity of a possible action as a means to attain something else which 
one wills,”65 meaning that the action being willed is good as a means to achieve 
something else other than fulfilling moral duty and does not have moral 
character like actions motivated by moral duties do.  
Indeed, the use of biomedical enhancements, as described by Clewis, may 
enable easier fulfillment of one’s goals at the time it is used, but it does not 
guarantee that the agent wants to improve herself––specifically her capacities 
(powers of spirit, mind, and body, to use Kant’s terms). So then, how can we make 
an assessment about moral worth and grant the praise that comes along with it, 
if we cannot identify an agent’s true motivations?  
Kant himself recognizes this difficulty; he agrees that the intentions in 
“the depths of the human heart are unfathomable.”66 I posit that perhaps 
 
65 AK 4: 414. 
66 AK 6: 447. 
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identifying how the agent is working to improve the likelihood of choosing and 
successfully achieving the right action for the future, rather than simply 
facilitating its fulfillment each time they are faced with a choice is an appropriate 
indicator for whether we can assign moral value, or worth, to an action, and to 
grant the agent the praise that comes along with it. I think this is the case, because 
the former expresses the intent of improving the agent’s powers of spirit, mind, 
and body; it fulfills the agent’s indirect duty to nurture inclinations that align 
with reason’s ends. The latter seems to focus on fulfilling hypothetical maxims, 
without a stronger regard for improving the agent’s own capacities or passions 
out of respect for her humanity. A practical illustration of the former could 
include focused self-reflection and skill-building, even if it is facilitated by the 
use of biomedical enhancements that improve focus. In this case, the agent is still 
putting in work: she is the one who needs to come up with the content of her 
reflection and utilize her powers of mind and spirit to perform the skill-building 
exercises, respectively. A biomedical enhancement such as a mood enhancer or 
energy-booster could enable her to stay motivated in these activities, or simply 
allow her to access the capacity to use the relevant mental work. Thus, when 
faced with a moral dilemma, she will have some of her own capacities better 
prepared to make the right decision and fulfill the tasks required of her to resolve 
the situation. She might even be better able to employ self-rule in such a case, if 
she nurtures her responsiveness to reason.  
If we grant that the use of biomedical enhancements in the agent’s self-
improvement process is morally-valuable, it appears that Clewis is right to 
conclude that certain biomedical enhancements are valuable, but not because 
 39 
they enhance self-rule, but because they influence the passions in a way that 
fulfills an indirect duty. Valuable enhancements deserving of moral praise would 
include those which allow for or enable self-improvement in the agent, in a way 
that makes it so that the agent is more prepared to exercise self-rule in the 
future.67  
Even if concerns about the moral value and praiseworthiness of using 
biomedical enhancements are resolved, how can we know how much of a 
person’s self-improvement can be attributed to the agent herself, if she used 
biomedical enhancements along the way? It seems like an agent has less 
ownership of her achievements using biomedical enhancements, compared to 
the case where she does not use them. If the agent herself is not the only ‘actor’ 
responsible for the fulfillment of the goal, how can we assign her moral praise? I 
will continue to develop the connection between effort and enhancement in 
Section II.D. 
 
II.D Biomedical Enhancements and Effort 
Now that we have established that the use of certain biomedical 
enhancements could still allow for an agent’s actions to have moral value (and 
thus moral praise), we can further investigate whether effort should play a role 
in our assessments of praise as well. In this section, I will outline and develop an 
argument presented by Hasko Von Kriegstein, who describes and defends the 
 
67 As a last note to respond to objections about self-rule, Clewis claims that even if enhancements 
alter dispositions, rather than promote self-rule, we cannot expect to “completely get rid of 
emotions such as fear, dread, or anxiety.” Thus, there will always be some challenge to overcome 
and exercise some extent of our own self-rule over. For someone who might hold a more 
conservative view of self-rule, this might be a way to lessen concerns about reducing dispositions, 
rather than overcoming them with the use of reason, or self-rule.  
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vital connection between exerted effort and the degree of an achievement, which 
can inform how much praise we should assign to some achievement, more 
generally.68 I then hope to bridge this argument to the Kantian framework.  
 
How Effort Affects Achievement 
I will adopt the understanding put forward by Hasko Von Kriegstein, 
about the relationship between effort and achievement. Namely, that the level of 
effort employed by a person should correlate to the level of achievement and 
subsequent praise granted to that achievement. He defines “[o]ne’s effort-level” 
as “the percentage of one’s internal resources (physical and mental) that one 
employs in a given task.”69 To make this argument, Von Kriegstein describes two 
notions of effort: “percentage-effort” and “absolute-effort,”	and that “percentage-
effort” is more important in assessing a person’s effort-level.70 Percentage-effort 
can be understood as “a measure of how close the particular agent in question 
had to go to their limits in order to reach their goal.”71 Absolute-effort, on the 
other hand, is the total amount of resources (mostly time, physical/mental 
energy, and skills) used by a person in pursuing their goal.  
In assessing achievements, I argue that percentage-effort should be the 
preferred notion of effort, because this accounts for the “agent-relative” aspect 
when assessing achievement. “Agent-relative” achievements are those in which 
we consider the skills and resources available to an individual. To illustrate why 
 
68 Hasko Von Kriegstein, “Effort and Achievement,” Utilitas 29, no. 1 (March 2017): 27–51, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820816000170. 
69 Ibid, 42.  
70 Ibid, 43.  
71 Ibid, 44.  
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this notion of effort is compelling, we can consider the case of a second-grade 
student running a marathon. Certainly, such an achievement is considered more 
impressive than the same feat being accomplished by an Olympic marathon 
runner, since the second grader had much fewer resources (physical and 
temporal) to have prepared for the marathon. Since the percentage effort 
expended by the second grader is much greater than that of the Olympic runner, 
this achievement is a much more impressive one (see Figure 1 for a visual 
representation). Von Kriegstein neatly summarizes the strength of using the 
notion of percentage-effort: “[i]t is very intuitive to think that it is admirable if 
someone operates near the limits of their physical and mental abilities.”72  
 
Von Kriegstein introduces more nuance into this account by pointing out 
that absolute-effort still plays a role in the determining the level of an 
 
72 Von Kriegstein, “Effort and Achievement,” 44.  
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achievement. He points out that “[w]hen one of two equally skilled agents 
dedicates more physical or mental resources to a task she will generally be more 
likely to be successful; and that is so independently of how much such resources 
she could have employed [original emphasis],” because unused resources do not 
influence the outcome.73 In other words, absolute-effort is a more helpful tool for 
assessing level of achievement between two individuals with similar amounts of 
resources at their disposal. Taking this information into account, Von Kriegtein 
concludes that “it is absolute-effort that enhances achievement in this indirect 
way.”74 Even so, it is percentage-effort that is at the core of his system of assessing 
achievement, which I will use for my argument.  
Given this information, I argue that since biomedical enhancements 
decrease the effort required to build a skill or complete a project (by improving 
the efficiency with which they learn such a skill, or increasing the agent’s focus 
or energy), the projects completed using them should also be considered a lesser 
achievement and, accordingly, less worthy of praise. This is not to say that the 
use of biomedical enhancements in the development and self-improvement of 
an agent’s capacities disqualifies the use of biomedical enhancements from 
deserving moral value and praise at all. In section II.C, I argued that certain 
biomedical enhancements which enable the agent to use her relevant capacities 
to improve upon herself, out of the motive of duty allows her actions to deserve 
praise. However, it seems like when a person not only fulfills her direct, perfect 
duties, but also fulfills the imperfect duty of improving her capacities and even 
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inclinations via an indirect duty, there is more effort going into a person’s actions 
overall.  
Using Von Kriegstein’s argument and conception of ‘percentage-effort’ 
and ‘absolute-effort,’ it appears that biomedical enhancements add additional 
resources for the agent to take advantage of, thus increasing the resources a 
person has at their disposal and decreasing the percentage effort a person 
expends (see Figure 2).  
 
Even in questions regarding self-rule, Von Kriegstein presents a 
compelling explanation for the difficulty in assessing effort applied to an activity 
and effort in deciding to engage in an activity or forcing oneself to perform an 
action. He explains “forcing oneself is not the hallmark of a second kind of 
effort… having to force oneself is the mental task of fighting off tempting 
distractions. Performing this mental task requires resources and is thus 
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effortful.”75 This idea––that effort goes into performing the mental task of 
decision making, and that the exertion of our effort is what should correlate with 
achievement––aligns well with my idea that the effort involved in developing 
capacities and fulfilling both our perfect and imperfect duties should correlate 
with the praise we assign these actions.  
 
Kant on Effort and Praise 
How can we apply Von Kriegstein’s account of percentage effort and 
achievement to Kantian ethics, especially regarding the duty to self-perfect? I 
argue that Kantian ethics would permit such a view and accordingly alter the 
praise we assign to actions and projects according to the effort an agent put into 
those pursuits.  
It is first important to note that Kant does, in fact, distinguish between 
moral and regular praise in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In 
discussing regular praise, Kant claims that when some inclination “serves the 
common good and is in conformity with duty,” it is “worthy of honor,” and 
“deserves praise and encouragement.”76 However, such an inclination does not 
deserve “esteem,” when “the maxim [on which the agent acted] lacks moral 
content, namely of doing such actions not from inclination but from duty.”77 
Thus, it appears that we can grant praise to actions, even if they are not done 
from the motive of duty, if they are morally-permissible and aid in making the 
morally-permissible decision. Promoting the adoption of inclinations which 
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“serv[e] the common good and [are] in conformity with duty”––can be 
understood as an indirect duty, which I described and defended earlier in 
Section II.C. Moral praise, on the other hand, can come from the moral worth of 
an action–– which is conferred when an agent acts on a maxim from the motive 
of moral duty.78 This is closely related to the idea of self-rule: that an agent is 
motivated by moral reasons, rather than inclination or disposition. Either way, 
Kant seems to agree that actions from both kinds of motivations, as long as the 
action is morally-permissible, deserve some kind of praise and recognition.    
This might seem like a somewhat controversial interpretation of praise 
on the Kantian view: that we can praise both moral and nonmoral actions (like 
those Von Kriegstein seems to discuss) in the same fashion, if moral praise is 
deserved due to the action’s special “esteem,” which is not shared with actions 
that are done from inclination.79 Here, I think it’s important to recognize again 
that Kant himself does not think we can identify with certainty what motivates 
each of us to act in certain ways. Furthermore, when we praise people 
outwardly––give them rewards and recognitions for their actions and choices, 
there do not seem to be any special differences, except the content we are 
praising them for.   
Another concern that might catch the Kantian’s attention is that Von 
Kriegstein seems to describe effort and the corresponding level of achievement 
for nonmoral endeavors––those that are not motivated by moral duty. The 
popular Kantian view is that moral worth is not influenced by effort, and it does 
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not vary in magnitude––the action either has it or does not, depending on 
whether the agent was sufficiently motivated by duty. If moral worth is the same 
across the board, how can we grant different levels of praise for it? I am not 
interested in arguing against this interpretation here, but I think that Kant would 
be sympathetic to the idea that even if moral worth is the same, the quantity of 
praise could still correspond to an agent’s percentage-effort, which takes into 
account the agent’s resources or lack thereof. Kant himself hints at the 
importance of considering obstacles (such as a lack of resources) in determining 
the quantity of merit:  
“The greater the natural obstacles (of sensibility) and the less the 
moral obstacle (of duty), so much the more merit is to be 
accounted for a good deed, as when, for example, at considerable 
self-sacrifice I rescue a complete stranger from great distress 
[original emphasis].”80 
 Here, Kant posits a positive correlation between the merit of a good deed 
and the magnitude of “natural obstacles” that had to be overcome to achieve it. 
These “natural obstacles” could include dispositions, but could also signify a lack 
of resources, potentially. Interestingly, this statement also accounts for the 
indirect duty to facilitate the fulfilment of direct duties, when he claims that the 
smaller the magnitude of “moral obstacles,” the more merit the good deed 
deserves.  
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 Thus, Von Kriegstein’s account of effort and praiseworthiness can be 
reasonably applied to Kantian ethics in the assessment of moral action, 
specifically in the use of biomedical enhancements in striving for self-perfection.  
 
II.E Practical Application 
In this section, I will apply the Kantian view I argued for above to current 
practices, namely, how award-granting institutions should assess work 
completed using biomedical enhancements. By award-granting institution, I 
refer to any organization that rewards the people who achieved any kind of 
creative, research, academic, or athletic project, based on their achievements. 
These rewards serve to express which achievements are most worthy of praise, 
or which deserve the largest quantity of praise. These institutions importantly 
express that the recipient of the award is responsible for their accomplishment.  
The inclusion of responsibility in criteria for meriting reward raises the 
question: do biomedical enhancements do the work for the researcher, artist, 
academic, athlete, or author? This question was partly answered during the 
discussion in Section II.C, regarding the role the biomedical enhancements play 
in the project fulfillment process: the agent must have employed her own 
capacities to some extent to claim credit for the project fulfillment. The relevant 
question that should be asked by reward-granting institutions should thus be: 
are the biomedical enhancements putting in the work or effort relevant to the 
reward, or are they being used by the agent to allow them to put in the reward-
relevant work?  
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Again, I think we can introduce nuance into this picture: what do people 
praise about the achievement? Oftentimes, it is the product itself that is 
considered valuable, rather than the effort put into the work. Thus, just the 
impact of the work can be assessed, without regard to the resources that the agent 
had at her disposal. At the same time, it appears especially impressive when a 
person at a much lower level of resources produces a work that is deemed to have 
higher quality than or is of equal quality to those with significantly more 
resources. Could an award-granting institution simply operate to assess only 
absolute-effort achievements, rather than percentage-effort achievements? 
Surely, award-granting institutions can set up their criteria in any way 
they see fit, but a Kantian assessment might yield interesting results. Given the 
conclusions we have reached so far, it appears an award-granting institution 
operating on a Kantian framework should take into account the effort required 
on the part of the agent in making their selections, so that the different uses of 
biomedical enhancements at different stages in a person’s pursuit of her 
achievement should inform the praise assigned to them. Importantly, the award-
granting institution first needs to define the object of the award: is the institution 
rewarding an isolated achievement, or a person’s performance in their work 
overall, taking into account their many achievements and growth over time?  
In the former case, since the achievement in question is only focused on 
the product of one’s work, it would seem that the enhancements which 
facilitated the pursuit of the project are the most salient: the use of enhancements 
that increased the person’s focus on the project, energy, and mood related to its 
pursuit should result in a greater deflation of an agent’s achievement, compared 
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to enhancements used in building the candidate’s skills related to the project’s 
pursuits, since these are related less directly to the achievement in question.  
 
What About Geniuses?  
 It isn’t surprising to see geniuses––individuals who seem to be naturally-
endowed with skills way beyond that of an average person––being granted 
prestigious awards in their disciplines. We seem to be in awe of geniuses, and 
recognize their accomplishments as impressive feats––is this intuitive praise of 
their achievements misplaced, if we accept Von Kriegstein’s view? Indeed, they 
do not need to expend as much percentage-effort as others to discover or 
accomplish something extremely impressive, since their naturally heightened 
capacities provide them with the additional resources that others do not have. 
Should their level of achievement thus be deflated if the institution deems that 
they did not expend as much percentage effort as others?  
 I argue that there may be two different ways to argue for praising 
geniuses: (1) if the percentage-effort notion is compelling, perhaps the additional 
resources conferred by their naturally heightened capacities are outweighed by 
the lack of resources in other areas, like temporal or physical resources (in the 
sense that geniuses do not as much time or physical/mental resources as others 
at their disposal), and (2) geniuses use the temporal and physical resources they 
have, but more efficiently.  
 Explanation (1) works only if the temporal and physical resources of the 
genius are very limited, so that the use of their natural capacities make up the 
majority of the resources available to the genius (see Figure 3). If the genius has 
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all the same temporal and physical resources compared to other candidates for 
an award, then their additional natural capacities add to the resources available 
to the genius, and thus decrease the percentage effort they used in pursuit of 
their goal. However, this is quite a specific and unlikely scenario, so it is not 
widely applicable.    
 
 Explanation (2) might be the better option between the two, but it is also 
weak. The genius may indeed have the same temporal and physical resources 
(also accounting for the resources from her natural capacities) compared to her 
competitors for an award and may use them to achieve the same percentage-
effort as others, but this effort simply produces more productive results (see 
Figure 4). Although this makes intuitive sense, this solution seems to take on a 
consequentialist lens by rewarding the better outcome––even if both agents 
expended the same amount of percentage effort. Since we are only focused on 
the effects of effort on praiseworthiness, and not on the outcome, this is a pretty 
weak solution.  
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Thus, unfortunately, we might have to bite the bullet on the case of the 
genius, if we accept the view of percentage-effort. However, this may not be that 
bad––perhaps geniuses may be motivated to use more of the resources at their 
disposal and expend more percentage-effort if they find this framework 
compelling, and for the majority of people who are not geniuses, this may also 
be an optimistic view on effort and the praise that should be assigned to it.  
 
In Part II, I addressed four important topics: how skill-building can be 
morally valuable on the Kantian view, what grants the overcoming of 
counterproductive dispositions value, how biomedical enhancements influence 
the effort an agent puts into completing projects, and how these conclusions 









 In this work, I argued that the Kantian duty to strive for self-perfection 
permits––but does not require––the use of biomedical enhancements, and that 
the use of biomedical enhancements can be morally valuable and worthy of 
moral praise, once we account for the existence of indirect duties in the Kantian 
framework. I then build upon the argument put forward by Hasko Von 
Kriegstein, namely, that percentage-effort expended in a project should 
correspond to the level of achievement assigned to that project. I then connect 
this account to Kantian ethics and argue that the percentage-effort an agent 
expends should be correlated with the praise assigned to them, in the context of 
award-granting institutions. Since all enhancements grant the agent additional 
resources, regardless of whether those enable the agent to do more work or make 
work easier, the percentage-effort expended is reduced. This reduction in 
percentage-effort should then lead to decreased praise for the agent.  
 Overall, this project aimed to develop the positive duties in Kant’s moral 
framework and to contribute a Kantian perspective on the increasingly 
important issue of navigating the use of biomedical enhancements. The 
connection between indirect duties and the imperfect duty to strive for self-
perfection is significant not only in the realm of Kantian ethics more broadly, but 
also demonstrates that Kantian ethics can serve as a valuable lens in discussions 
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